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An old Jewish tale I learned from my mother:
A merchant, newly wealthy, decided to educate his chil-
dren in style. He advertised for a tutor in the classics,
Romance languages, the sciences, and literature. The next
day, an old man, somewhat seedily dressed, showed up at
the merchant's door, saying that he was responding to the
advertisement. With some hesitation, the butler showed
the visitor in. The merchant, though surprised by the ap-
plicant's appearance, began the interview.
"What is your background in the classics? ' he asked.
"I don't know from the classics."
"And in which Romance languages are you fluentT'
"None of them."
"And what do you know of science and literature? '
"Hardly anything," answered the old man with a shrug.
' My good man," said the merchant with patience slightly
. Professor of Law, University of Michigan; BA., Harvard University, 1973;
J.D., Harvard Law School 1976; D. Phil., Oxford University, 1979. My thanks to my
mother.
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strained, "you don't seem to have any of the qualifications
for the position. Why did you come here today?"
"I came," said the old man with a flourish, "to tell you: On
me you shouldn't depend."
That is a story, of course, about the value of information.
The old man did have a point: The merchant's quest for the best
tutor for his children may have been advanced, however infin-
itesimally, by knowledge that he need not worry about forsaking
the opportunity to hire this one potential tutor. But the infor-
mation hardly seems valuable enough to warrant the merchant's
time. And so, though it rarely generates more than a polite hint
of laughter, I often use this old chestnut in Evidence class to il-
lustrate a basic point made by Professor David Crump: Evidence
is relevant, under the modern definition exemplified by Federal
Rule of Evidence 401, if it has "any tendency" to increase or de-
crease the probability of a proposition of consequence to the ac-
tion.' That tendency might be very slight; even if there are many
alternatives to the proposition at issue (e.g., thousands of poten-
tial tutors or murderous Colombian drug lords?), evidence tend-
ing to make any one of them less probable also will tend to make
the material proposition more probable, and thus will be rele-
vant. Dean McCormick famously pointed out that a piece of evi-
dence could satisfy the test of relevance even if it was, meta-
phorically, merely a brick rather than an entire wall.2 Professor
Crump aptly extends the metaphor by pointing out that, under
the Rule 401 definition, an atom qualifies just as well as the
brick does.3
Of course, to say that evidence is relevant under this minim-
alist definition does not mean that it will be offered into evi-
dence, or that it is or should be admissible, or even that it is ad-
missible unless some specific exclusionary rule applies. If the
probative value of the evidence is very slight, usually the poten-
tial proponent will recognize that and not find the proffer
worthwhile: It costs time and money to present evidence, the
fact-finder's attention will likely be distracted from more impor-
tant information, and the fact-finder may well infer that only a
party with a very weak case would present such worthless evi-
dence. Moreover, even if the proponent does offer evidence with
minuscule probative value, the court is likely to rule it
1. See David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1,
2 (1997); FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining "relevant evidence").
2. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 339 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992).
3. See Crump, supra note 1, at 11.
[34:55
HeinOnline  -- 34 Hous. L. Rev. 56 1997-1998
COMMENTARY ON CRUMP
"irrelevant," without worrying very much whether it actually
fails to satisfy the Rule 401 definition of relevance. And even if
the court chooses to be punctilious, it can exclude the evidence
under Rule 403 or its counterpart, on the ground that whatever
probative value the evidence might have is substantially out-
weighed by the costs of admitting it--including, if nothing else,
waste of time.4 Finally, even if the evidence survives this bal-
ancing test, it might indeed run afoul of some specific exclusion-
ary rule.5 But, as Professor Crump explains vividly, evidence
that seemingly has insubstantial probative value often slips
through all these filters and is offered and admitted.
6
Professor Crump's analysis runs the full traverse from aca-
demic theorizing to practical observation. I will attempt to follow
him over the same course, addressing three questions among the
congeries that he raises. First, is it true that all evidence satis-
fies the minimalist definition of relevance?7 Second, should evi-
dentiary codes include a tighter definition of relevance? 8 Third,
how should we assess lawyers' use of evidence that, loosely
speaking, is irrelevant?9
I. EXPLORING THE MINIMALIST DEFINITION OF RELEVANCE
I will begin by restating in somewhat formal terms the defi-
nition of relevance contained in Rule 401. Suppose evidence E is
offered with respect to hypothesis H. Let 0 represent all other
information that the factfinder may validly consider with respect
to H; this may include other evidence and also information that
the factfinder received outside the courtroom but is permitted to
use at trial.10 Then E is relevant to H if, and only if, P(HI E,O)
4. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
5. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (excluding, subject to exceptions, "[e]vidence of
a person's character or a trait of character" to prove "action in conformity there-
with"); FED. R. EVID. 409 (barring evidence of offers or promises "to pay medical,
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury" in order "to prove liability for
the injury"); FED. R. EVID. 802 (excluding hearsay evidence except as provided by
the Federal Rules or by other rules established by the Supreme Court or by Con-
gress).
6. See Crump, supra note 1, at 22-46.
7. See id. at 5.
8. See id. at 6.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAiRD C. KuPATRICK, EVIDENCE
§ 2.10, at 102-03 (1995). Mueller and Kirkpatrick discuss two types of "background
knowledge" jurors are allowed to possess. One is "communicative facts," which in-
volve knowledge of the basic English language, including knowing "the ordinary
meaning of common words... [and] idioms, common shorthand and slang expres-
1997]
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differs from P(HI O)-that is, if the probability of H given E and
0 is different, either greater or less than, the probability of H
merely given 0.11 And it is easy to show that, if P(HI E,O) differs
from P(H I Not-E, 0)-the probability of H given 0 and the propo-
sition that E is not true-then it also differs from P(HI 0), and in
the same direction. 12
Sometimes the relationship of the evidence to the hypothesis
is such that P(HI E,0) and P(HI 0), or P(HI E,0) and P(HI Not-
E,0), can be compared directly, without the need for an interme-
diate step. Suppose, for example, that the hypothesis H at issue
is that Defendant murdered Victim, and the evidence E is that
Defendant had a substantial motive to do so-the desire to pre-
vent Victim from exposing a prior murder committed by Defen-
dant. It is easy enough to see that H is more likely given E than
it would be given the negation of E, or given the absence of any
new information as to whether or not E is true. The motive
would plausibly be a cause of the murder in the sense that it
makes the murder more probable. E therefore is relevant.
Sometimes the evidence is relevant to the hypothesis even
sions, and the usual meaning of nonverbal cues (like shrugging and pointing)." Id. at
102. The second is "evaluative facts," which are "general background facts necessary
to evaluate or appraise the evidence in the case.... Such facts are matters of essen-
tially universal knowledge in human experience... [including] that fire
burns .... that deprivation of oxygen causes death, that gravity causes things to
fall, that sexual intercourse can cause pregnancy," etc. Id. Mueller and Kirkpatrick
conclude that "both kinds of background information are indispensable to the fact-
finding process for it is just such knowledge that enables jurors to comprehend and
evaluate the evidence formally adduced in the case." Id. at 103.
11. I am putting aside for now the question of whose probability assessments-
the judge's, the jury's, or those of a hypothetical juror-are being considered. I will
address this issue briefly in Part II. I am also putting aside the difficult problem of
defining conditional relevance, or what I prefer to call conditional probative value.
See FED. R. EVID. 401(b). For a recent exchange on this issue, see Richard D. Fried-
man, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV.
439, 439-41 (1994) (disputing the notion that conditional relevance is a "myth," as
some commentators have asserted, while concluding that the "expression of the con-
cept in evidentiary rules should not be discarded but rather refreshed"); Dale A.
Nance, Conditional Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1995) (comparing my analysis to Nance's own, em-
phasizing the best evidence principle, and criticizing some of my proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules); Richard D. Friedman, Refining Conditional Probative
Value, 94 MICH. L. REV. 457 (1995) (comparing Nance's analysis to my own, and dis-
cussing his comments on my proposed amendments); Peter Tillers, Exaggerated and
Misleading Reports of the Death of Conditional Relevance, 93 MCH. L. REV. 478
(1994).
12. P(Hj O) = P(EI O) x P(HI E, O) + P(Not-EI O) x P(HINot-E,O). P(Not-Ej O)
- 1-P(E I0), and must be positive. P(H 10) therefore may be seen to be equal to
P(HIE,O) + [1-P(E (0)] x [P(HINot-E,0)-P(HIE,0)]. Thus, if P(HINot-E,0) is, re-
spectively, greater than, equal to, or less than P(H E,O), then P(HI 0) is similarly
greater than, equal to, or less than P(HI EO).
[34:55
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though their relationship is not quite so immediately apparent.
It may be, for example, that if E is true it makes an intermediate
proposition I more probable, and that, whether or not E is true, if
Iis true it makes H more probable. In this case, proof of E makes
H more probable. 13 And the same type of reasoning might be ex-
tended indefinitely, involving a series of intermediate proposi-
tions Ii through Im. As shown nicely by Professor Crump in his
demonstration of how rainfall in Utah might be relevant to theft
in Chicago, 14 these chains might be very extended.
Another potential complication in the relationship between
evidence and hypothesis is particularly important: It may be that
they are causally related, but that causation runs from hypothe-
sis to evidence. Suppose, for example, H is the proposition that
Defendant handled a gun believed to be the murder weapon, and
E is the proposition that Defendant's fingerprints have been
found on the gun. The evidence seems plainly relevant, but why?
It seems clear enough that P(E I H, 0) is, or at least might well be
considered to be, greater than P(E I Not-H,O)-if H is true, that
is likely to make E more probable than it would be if H were not
true. But E is what we know and it is the probability of H that
we are trying to assess. That is, the causal relationship between
H and E may give us some sense of P(E I H, 0) and P(E I Not-H, 0),
but we are trying to assess P(HI E,O). In other words, we have to
transpose the conditional-planning the H to the left, and the E
to the right, of the vertical line representing conditionality.
Bayes's Theorem (or Rule) expresses the relationship.1 5 For pres-
ent purposes, it will be easiest to express Bayes's Theorem in
terms of odds, rather than of probabilities:
O(HI E.O) = O(HI 0) x LHE
where O(X), the odds of X, equals the ratio of PX(X to P(Not-X), or
P(X) I [1-P(X)], and LHE, the likelihood ratio of E with respect to
H, is the ratio of P(EIHO) to P(EI Not-H,O).16 In other words,
the posterior odds of H (the odds of H given the evidence) equal
13. P(HI EO) = P(Il EO) x P(H[I,E,O) + [1-Pal E,O)] x P(HI Not-IE,O). Simi-
larly, P(HINot-E,O) = P(IINot-EO) x P(HIINot-E,O) + [l-P(IlNot-EoO)] x
P(HI Not-INot-E,O). Assuming that P(HI I,EO) = P(HI I.Not-E.O) = P(Hl) = Ci, and
similarly that P(HINot-IE,O) = P(HlNot-.,Not-EO) = P(HlNot-) = C, then
P(HIE,O)-P(HjNot-E,O) = [P(IE,O)-P(IINot-E,O)] x [C1-C2]. Thus, if P(IIEO) >
Pal Not-E,O), and Cz > Cz--that is, E makes I more probable and I makes H more
probable-P(HI E,O) > P(Hl Not-EO), which means that E makes H more probable.
14. See Crump, supra note 1, at 9-11.
15. See Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-501 (1970).
16. For a simple exposition of this form of Bayes's Theorem, see BERNARD
ROBERTSON & GA. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 16-18, 221-28 (1995).
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the prior odds of H (the odds as assessed before consideration of
the evidence) multiplied by the likelihood ratio.
It is easy to see from this expression that if LHE equals 1-if
P(E I H, 0) equals P(E I Not-H, 0)--the evidence is irrelevant, be-
cause the posterior odds are equal to the prior odds. If LHE is
greater than 1-the evidence is more likely to arise given H than
given Not-H-the evidence is relevant, making H appear more
likely than it did before consideration of the evidence. Corre-
spondingly, if LHE is less than 1, the evidence is relevant in the
opposite direction, making H appear less probable than it did be-
forehand.
All this may appear painfully familiar to readers that have
followed the academic debate over the use of probabilistic analy-
sis in discourse about evidence. 17 But I have set out some aspects
of the Bayesian approach because I think they help illuminate a
basic point on which I agree with Professor Crump, and the ex-
tremity at which I disagree. I agree with him that most evidence
that parties are likely to offer, and much that they are not (such
as rainfall in Utah when the issue is theft in Chicago), satisfies
the minimalist definition of relevance. 18 One way of putting this
is that the likelihood ratio will not equal exactly 1-there is
some basis for assessing P(E I H, 0) as different from P(E I Not-
H,0), either greater or lesser.
I am not satisfied, however, that all evidence meets the
minimalist definition of relevance. Consider an illustration used
by Professor Crump-a brown stone, or other object neither
green nor an emerald, offered to help prove the proposition that
most emeralds on the crust of the earth are green. 19 Professor
Crump maintains that even this evidence is relevant because
"[a]s we exhaust the finite stuff that could disprove the ques-
tioned proposition, we increase the probability that the proposi-
tion is true."20 But one could as easily say that, as we exhaust
the finite stuff that could prove the questioned proposition, we
decrease the probability that the proposition is true. Before
knowing the nature of the object, we do not know whether it is
(a) a green emerald, (b) a nongreen emerald, or (c) a nonemerald.
If the object turns out to be a green emerald, it will tend (ever so
17. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 15, at 517 (suggesting that
mathematical techniques such as Bayes's Theorem could lead to a fairer evaluation
of identification evidence); Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1991); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of
Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377 (1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Pre-
cision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
18. See Crump, supra note 1, at 9-14.
19. See id. at 13.
20. Id.
[34:55
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slightly) to prove the proposition, because that result is more
likely given the truth of the proposition than given its falsity; by
the same token, if the object turns out to be a nongreen emerald,
it will tend (perhaps slightly more) to disprove the proposition,
because that result is more likely given the falsity of the propo-
sition than given its truth.2' But I do not see any basis for con-
cluding that a non-emerald (which, we knew before looking, de-
scribes most of the earth) is more or less likely to be found given
the truth of the proposition than given its falsity. This evidence,
I believe, should leave an assessment of the probability of the
proposition just where it was before the evidence was found.
Nor am I convinced that cases of absolute irrelevance are
limited to fanciful hypotheticals like this. Suppose that a prose-
cutor introduces evidence of the victim's blood type.2- If the
prosecutor later offers evidence that blood of that type was found
on the clothes the defendant wore that day, and that the defen-
dant has another blood type, the combined evidence might have
great probative value. But without that predicate, it does not
seem to me that evidence of the victim's blood type has any pro-
bative value; it is akin to the sound of one hand clapping.
Now I must add two complications. First, probability, at
least the conception of probability that is ordinarily useful in
evidentiary analysis, is a subjective matter, dependent on the
individual observer's own personal assessments.23 Conventional
probability theory puts some constraints on the relationships
among these assessments, prescribing in effect that a person
cannot rationally hold certain combinations of assessments. 24
The theory does not, however, prescribe generally the probability
assessment that an observer should attach to a given proposi-
tion. Therefore, when Rule 401 speaks of evidence making a
given proposition "more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence,"2 5 it begs a question that is critical
when the fact-finder is a jury-more or less probable according to
whose assessment? The court's probability assessments should
not control, because the court might deem the evidence to have
21. Hence, if before examining this particular object we think the proposition
is probably true, we would regard result (a) as more probable than result (b).
22. Blood type might give some indication of the person's race. &e, e.g., Ian
Ayres et al, Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV.
805, 862 (1993) (stating that "the blood type A population is disproportionately
white and the blood type B population is disproportionately black"). In particular
cases, this might have some significance, but this can be set aside by assuming re-
alistically that the race of the victim is already known.
23. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Assessing Euidence, 94 MICH. L REV. 1810,
1816 (1996).
24. See id.
25. FED. R. EVID. 401.
1997]
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little or no probative value even though a juror might rationally
ascribe substantial value to it. But the court cannot know what
probability assessments a juror will make.
Does this indicate that all evidence is necessarily relevant
because a juror might regard the evidence as tending to alter the
probability of the litigated proposition? I do not believe so. I do
not think the relevance definition is meant to leave an open gate
to evidence on the basis that some juror-no matter how un-
founded or foolish her thought on the matter might be-might
conceivably find the evidence probative. The relevance inquiry is
bounded; roughly speaking, it seems to me, the court should fo-
cus on the hypothetical juror who is most persuaded by the evi-
dence but still within the bounds of reasonableness. 26 And the
same admittedly difficult framework should apply in deciding
the threshold question of relevance. Thus, a judge considering
evidence of the nonemerald variety might conclude: "I do not see
how this evidence bears on the proposition at issue, nor do I see
how any juror acting reasonably could believe that it does. So
unless I am persuaded that such a juror could believe that, I am
going to hold the evidence irrelevant."
In some sense, then, the matter may always be open. A con-
clusion that evidence is irrelevant amounts to a conclusion that
no reasonable observer would have any basis for assessing the
prior and posterior probabilities as being at all different. That is
quite a vulnerable conclusion. We may not know whether there
is some reasonable observer who would indeed find some basis
for some divergence. But courts have to issue rulings in finite
time, and even law review articles must end. So I will leave the
matter much the same way as does this hypothetical judge: Un-
less Professor Crump persuades me otherwise, and he has not
done so thus far, I believe the nonemerald evidence is irrelevant.
The second complication is that juridical evidence is not or-
dinarily simply "found" by the fact-finder, like the rock that is
not an emerald. Rather, it must ordinarily be found, or created,
and presented by a party to the litigation, and the process by
which the evidence comes to be presented in court might have
26. Professor Crump accurately points out that the drafters of the Federal
Rules avoided the formulation of the old Uniform Rule of Evidence 1(2), which spoke
of "a tendency in reason" to prove the matter at issue. See Crump, supra note 1, at
7. And he properly states: "The Federal Rules thus avoid undue emphasis on the
logical process at the expense of experience, and they support the use of general
principles from jurors' past perceptions." Id. In suggesting that the relevance in-
quiry is bounded by a reasonableness inquiry, I do not mean to suggest otherwise.
One might say that a juror is acting reasonably even if her conclusions are based on
experience and past perceptions rather than on any apparent exercise of reason.
[34:55
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considerable significance.2 7 Consider another illustration used by
Professor Crump: In an assault case, the defense offers, along
with some other evidence of dubious probative value, an apple.2
Professor Crump regards the evidence as relevant on grounds
analogous to those bearing on the brown stone-it shows "that a
tiny piece of the accessible universe does not furnish physical
evidence of guilt."29 I regard it as presumptively irrelevant for
reasons similar to those I suggested in connection with the
brown stone: I cannot find any basis for concluding that the ap-
ple is more likely to appear in its present condition given the in-
nocence of the defendant than given his guilt. But this raises a
question that a reasonable juror might certainly ask: Given this
lack of probative value, does the fact that defense counsel both-
ered to present the evidence suggest that she was trying to clut-
ter up the case to obscure the weakness of the defense? If so, the
evidence might weigh against the defense. To give a different
meaning to a nice phrase used by Professor Crump, the evidence
might paradoxically be "relevant precisely because it is irrele-
vant. 30
This line of argument would be available whenever a propo-
nent offers evidence of no apparent probative value for no appar-
ent reason other than to shroud weakness. Nevertheless, I do not
believe that it need deflect us from the conclusion that evidence
might fail to satisfy the minimalist definition of Rule 401. It
seems doubtful at best that evidence should be admitted when
the only possible legitimate basis on which it may be used is to
the detriment of the proponent. Further, it seems that our un-
derstanding of the definition of relevance should follow in the
same direction: Where Rule 401 says "more probable or less
probable,"31 we might interpolate "whichever is to the advantage
of the proponent."
27. I have discussed this approach at some length. See Richard D. Friedman,
Still Photographs in the Flow of Time, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243 (1995) (Review
Essay).
28. See Crump, supra note 1, at 13-14.
29. See id. at 14. Professor Crump goes on to state that "if we were to provide
the defense attorney with infinite time, he could offer every available physical object
that does not show guilt, thus enhancing more substantially the probability of inno-
cance." Id. But, of course, if the defendant is guilty and there are objects that would
show this, then the defense attorney would have to avoid those; it seems to me,
therefore, that until the defense attorney begins presenting objects that might be
expected to reveal guilt if the defendant is in fact guilty, this massive world-dump
does not accomplish anything.
30. See id. at 13 (emphasis omitted). Professor Crump uses the phrase to
summarize an argument I do not find persuasive concerning the nonemerald evi-
dence. See id. Refer to note 21 supra and accompanying text (discussing the
nonemerald example).
31. FED. R. EVID. 401.
1997]
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II. REVISING THE RuLEs ON MINIMAL RELEVANCE
Up to now, my discussion has been not only theoretical but
entirely academic, in the sense that the difference between Pro-
fessor Crump and myself does not affect the actual decision of
cases. That is, whether a given piece of evidence has only infini-
tesimal probative value, the irreducible minimum according to
Professor Crump, 32 or no probative value at all, which I contend
is possible, the evidence should not be admitted. The court
should exclude it under Rule 403 or the governing local counter-
part, if for no other reason than that the insubstantial probative
value that is the most the evidence can claim does not warrant
the time the evidence would require to present.
I believe, as does Professor Crump, that in the hands of a
pragmatic, confident, and decisive judge, Rule 403 is a sufficient
tool to weed out evidence of insubstantial probative value.83 I
also agree with him that not all judges meet this description, and
for this reason trials can spin out of control.8 4 I probably am less
concerned than he is by the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, because
I think it is important not to fall into the Simpson Elephantiasis
Fallacy-the tendency to draw any broad lesson about ordinary
American evidence or criminal procedure from a trial that was a
caricature of the norm. And I probably am less sanguine than he
that, if a given judge does not use Rule 403 to maintain proper
control over the trial, any rules amendment-at least any
amendment that would not intolerably limit the judge's discre-
tion-would relieve the problem substantially.
Nevertheless, I do believe that it might be useful to retool
Rule 401, to make it better express the way we hope judges will
address questions of relevance and probative value. Rule 402
prescribes that all relevant evidence is admissible unless ex-
cluded by other Rules or other governing authority.35 But this
rule of presumptive admissibility does not accurately reflect the
decision-making process. Even though I do not agree with Pro-
fessor Crump that all evidence is relevant under the minimalist
definition of Rule 401,36 1 agree that the evidence that might ac-
tually be admissible in a given case represents only a small por-
tion of the great mass of evidence that satisfies that definition. If
32. See Crump, supra note 1, at 12-14.
33. See id. at 17.
34. See id. at 17-18; see also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Ob-
servations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497,
500-10 (1993) (discussing problems in the application of Rule 403 resulting from a
failure to define "unfairly prejudicial").
35. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
36. See Crump, supra note 1, at 3.
[34:55
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Rule 402 is genuinely to state a presumptive rule of admissibility
for a mass of evidence defined by Rule 401, then Rule 401 ought
first to do most of the job of whittling the mass down; the heavy
cutting should not be left to the general discretion provided by
Rule 403.37
The simplest fix would be to insert the word "substantial"
into Rule 401:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any substan-
tial tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Better yet, Rule 401 could be revised slightly to clarify that
probative value, a term used by Rule 403, and relevance are
measures of the same concept, relevance being binary (yes or no)
and probative value being a matter of degree:
"Probative value" of evidence means the extent to which
the evidence tends to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. "Relevant evidence" means evidence having
substantial probative value.38
Professor Crump counsels against amendment of Rule 401.
39
But it seems to me that his concerns do not apply to the type of
amendment I propose here. He rightly expresses the view that
requiring "a tendency in reason" or "logical" support of the mat-
ter to be proved-an approach rejected by the Advisory Commit-
tee in drafting the RuleO---"might obscure the propriety of using
inferences from common experience to supply the evidential hy-
pothesis."41 But the amendment I am proposing does not raise
this danger; it allows the same type of inference that the current
Rule does, but only insists that the evidence satisfy some threshold
37. For the text of Rule 403, refer to note 4 supra.
38. A third alternative would be to delete "substantial" from this draft, so that
the definition of relevant evidence remains as it is under the present Rule 401. Un-
der this alternative, Rule 402 should be revised, so that it provides a presumptive
rule of admissibility for evidence having substantial probative value, and a rule of
exclusion for evidence without substantial probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 402
(stating that all relevant is admissible unless otherwise proscribed and that all ir-
relevant evidence is inadmissible). But this approach preserves a distinction of little
worth, between evidence of no probative value and evidence of insubstantial proba-
tive value.
39. See Crump, supra note 1, at 47.
40. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note (contrasting Rule 401 with
Uniform Rule 1(2)). Refer to note 26 supra and accompanying text.
41. See Crump, supra note 1, at 47-48.
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of strength before it may be characterized as relevant. Professor
Crump also seems to express some doubt as to whether "a
meaningful threshold of probative value" can be developed ade-
quately.42 True, my proposed revisions rely on the term
"substantial," a word. that is determinedly vague, but no more
vague than "substantially" in Rule 403. The revised Rule, in ei-
ther of the forms I have suggested, would not prescribe results
any more than the current Rules do, but it would provide the
proper framework for a court's decision. Furthermore, it would
conform the formal meaning of the term "irrelevant" to the
meaning that it ordinarily has in workaday practice and, indeed,
to the meaning that it has in much of Professor Crump's article.
Professor Crump suggests amending Rule 403 rather than
Rule 401.4 This strikes me as a less than optimal approach. For
one thing, it does nothing to address a problem that Professor
Crump himself highlights: The definition of relevant evidence in
Rule 401 has little value because so much evidence-indeed, in
Professor Crump's view, all evidence-satisfies it.44 Much of Pro-
fessor Crump's argument is aimed at showing that evidence that
we are used to regarding as irrelevant in fact has infinitesimal
probative value of no probative significance; it seems practical,
therefore, to change the definition of relevance to conform to both
the common usage and the practical import of the term. Nor does
an amendment to Rule 403 satisfy the related problem with Rule
402 that I have suggested above, that the Rule purports to make
relevant evidence presumptively admissible even though most
evidence satisfying the minimalist definition of relevance should
be excluded.
I also have some doubts about the particulars of Professor
Crump's proposed revision of Rule 403. It purports to add a sec-
ond layer to the test of that Rule. Professor Crump's revision
provides that evidence of insubstantial probative value should be
excluded if that probative value is "counter-balanced by" the
negative considerations enumerated in the Rule; for evidence of
greater probative value, the proposed revision retains the
"substantially outweighed" of the current Rule.45 Obviously, less
of a down side is necessary to warrant exclusion when the proba-
tive value of the evidence is minimal than when it is significant.
But it is not obvious to me that a different ratio of negative to
42. See id. at 47.
43. See id. at 48-49.
44. See id. at 3.
45. See id. at 49-50; FED. R. EVID. 403 (prescribing that relevant evidence is
admissible unless it is substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the jury, or waste of time).
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positive considerations is appropriate for the two different cases.
I am not even quite sure, given that the balancing test of Rule
403 weighs apples against oranges, what the difference in ratio
means. Moreover, whatever the theoretical validity of this two-
ratio approach, I suspect that trial judges would find it confusing
and unduly complicated. Will we see litigation over which ratio
applies? Will courts, which until now have gotten to the results
they found sensible by using one ratio, find uncomfortable the
choice between two ratios, and so develop a sliding scale, so that
the greater the probative value of the evidence the greater must
be the ratio of negative to positive considerations for exclusion to
be warranted? We run a real danger, I think, of overintellectu-
alizing decisions that depend greatly on intuition.
Much simpler, it seems to me, is the sequential process sug-
gested by my proposed revision. First, the judge asks whether
the evidence has significant probative value. If the answer is
negative, the evidence is excluded without further ado. If the an-
swer is positive, the judge considers whether the negative conse-
quences of admission, as enumerated in Rule 403, are suffi-
ciently great to warrant exclusion notwithstanding the probative
value of the evidence. If the answer is positive, the evidence is
excluded. If the answer is negative, the evidence is admitted un-
less any specific exclusionary rules apply.
Ill. META-RELEVANCE
Professor Crump offers a fascinating analysis of evidence
that has insignificant probative value but is nevertheless offered
and often admitted. 46 Interestingly, he defines as outside the
scope of his inquiry what I believe is a particularly common
situation: The evidence has insubstantial probative value with
respect to the material proposition as to which it is supposedly
offered, but it bears closely on another proposition that is not a
proper subject of proof and that raises a significant danger of
prejudice. 47 For example, suppose the defendant is charged with
having committed theft by cutting a chain-link fence with a pair
of shears, and the prosecution, supposedly to prove the defen-
dant's ability to cut the fence, offers proof that on a prior occa-
sion the defendant committed theft by similar means. The evi-
dence appears to suggest quite strongly a point that the jury is
not supposed to use it to consider, the defendant's propensity to
commit crimes of the nature of the one charged. On the ground
for which it is offered, however, the evidence presumably has
46. See Crump, supra note 1, at 20-46.
47. See id. at 4-5, 20-21.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 34 Hous. L. Rev. 67 1997-1998
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
rather slight probative value, because there was probably not
much doubt about the defendant's ability to cut the fence. Never-
theless, courts often allow admission of such evidence.
Putting aside this type of case, Professor Crump offers sev-
eral examples of what might be called "meta-relevance."48 That
is, even though the information provided by the witness's testi-
mony has only slight probative value, the event of the lawyer's
question and the witness's answer has substantial value to the
proponent. The topic is important, because I suspect Professor
Crump is right that a great deal of time actually spent at trial is
taken up by evidence that the proponent offers only because of
its meta-relevance. Ordinarily, we tend to think that lawyers
will not waste too much time offering evidence that has little
probative value, because it does their case too little good. Profes-
sor Crump's analysis provides a useful corrective to this view:
The meta-relevance might provide an incentive to present the
evidence even though the evidence itself conveys little informa-
tion.49
The extent to which this is a good or bad thing largely de-
pends, of course, on whether the meta-relevance is in itself in-
formation that is net beneficial to the truth-determining process
and worth the time that it takes to present. Professor Crump
recognizes this and acknowledges that some evidence of minimal
probative value may on balance be worthy of admission.50 His
emphasis, though, is on the damage that evidence of this sort
can do.5
1
I agree that courts probably would do better by more agress-
ively limiting such evidence, though as already suggested I doubt
that changes of rules would be necessary to achieve this result or
effective in doing so. I also am probably readier than Professor
Crump is to find benefit in evidence that has minimal probative
value but that serves the functions he identifies. And I believe he
overemphasizes at least one danger.
Consider first what Professor Crump calls the entertain-
ment or ingratiation function and the editorial or rhetorical
48. Christopher Mueller and I both have spoken about meta-evidence, giving
that term somewhat different meanings. He used it to describe evidence that casts
light on the probative value of a recurrent type of evidence, and I more broadly used
it to describe evidence about evidence. See Christopher B. Mueller, Meta-Evidence:
Do We Need It?, 25 LOY. LA. L. REV. 819 (1992); Friedman, supra note 27, at 255. In
speaking about meta-relevance, I mean to suggest that sometimes evidence has pro-
bative value not simply because of the information it expresses but also because of
the manner in which it is secured.
49. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 1, at 21.
50. See id. at 46-47.
51. See id.
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function.52 1 I believe most people that care about the persuasive-
ness of their communication, especially with relative strangers,
find a need to ingratiate themselves with their audiences. Cer-
tainly teachers do that, and so do after-dinner speakers that be-
gin with a joke or pleasantry. To a large extent, ingratiation may
be considered a lubricant of the channels of communication, and
that seems to me to be a good thing. And, as Professor Crump
acknowledges, "[p]acing and drama are important to every
story.... In fact, a certain amount of orientation helps the jury
understand the evidence. 5 3
Moreover, a litigating lawyer may need to establish rapport
not only with the court and the jury but also with the witness. If
a cross-examiner decides to take the amiable approach, as in
Professor Crump's example of Adrian Burk examining Joe Bill
Walker,54 that ultimately might be helpful to make the witness
relax, cooperate with the cross-examiner, and speak more freely.
This may well yield benefits for the truth-determining process
that are worth some trial time.
Of course, these matters might be taken too far, and the
court must be prepared to constrain the lawyer. But I think most
lawyers know that if they appear to be playing too much for
laughs their conduct is likely to be counterproductive; the jurors
will likely take the high ratio of style to substance as an indica-
tion that substance is absent from her case, and they may even
resent her for not treating them seriously. 5
Now consider what Professor Crump calls the witness con-
trol or debilitation function.56 Debilitation sounds bad, and so I
am against it. But I am all for confrontation. That, in fact, is
what cross-examination is all about. Testifying is not meant to
be a fun experience, and I think it probably is often helpful to the
truth-determining process to see how a witness's testimony
stands up under a moderate level of stress. (In some contexts, as
with child witnesses and witnesses giving accusatory testimony
about sexual violence, it may be that the stress inherent in the
situation is so great, and so much more than optimal from the
point of view of truth determination as well as of the witness's
own welfare, that the court ought to attempt to relieve the stress
to the extent reasonably possible.)
52. See id. at 26, 30.
53. Id. at 30-31.
54. See id. at 22-25.
55. I remember vividly my senior on one case, a very witty lawyer, affirma-
tively restraining himself (not an easy thing for him) from being more than occa-
sionally amusing in front of the jury;, he expressed the fear that the jurors would go
against "the laughing Jew from New York"
56. See Crump, supra note 1, at 32.
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Sometimes, of course, the details of cross-examination give it
value, and those details may take time to develop. Professor
Crump finds the "bit-by-bit" procedure offensive,57 and no doubt
lawyers sometimes do extend it too far. But we should also ac-
knowledge that a lawyer dealing with a hostile witness must ad-
vance very slowly, like a soldier advancing in a mine field. If we
prevent lawyers from taking cross in small steps, we may not
only deprive them of substantial drama but may inhibit the ex-
amination and hurt the search for truth.
58
Beyond that, on occasion it is the very protraction of the ex-
amination that makes it useful. Max Steuer's cross-examination
of a witness in the criminal trial arising from the devastating
Triangle Waist Company fire of 1911 is a celebrated example:
Only on several repetitions of her story, each given with strik-
ingly similar wording and imagery, did it become apparent that
her testimony was not, or at least was not merely, an account
from her memory.59
Finally, I will address the jury debilitation function. Profes-
sor Crump argues that evidence of minimal relevance unneces-
sarily extends trials and that this extension skews the selection
of jurors for major trials.60 He may be right to some extent. I
suspect, though, that even if Professor Crump were able to shave
from a long trial all the evidence that had too little value to war-
rant admissibility, he would still be left with a long trial, long
enough to discourage jurors eager to avoid major disruptions in
their lives. Thus, consider-just one more time, because it does
illustrate extended litigation-the Simpson case. Professor
Crump uses the criminal trial as an illustration of a trial that
was extended far too long by evidence of insubstantial probative
value.61 But notice that the civil trial also took months of evidence,62
even though, given that the same issues had already been tried
once, there were opportunities for shortening it, and even though
the presiding judge was aggressive and determined not to repeat
57. See id. at 35-37 & n.174.
58. For an analysis of a well-known example from the Lizzie Borden murder
trial of how the "bit-by-bit approach may help a cross-examiner make cautious ad-
vances without undue risk, see Edgar Lustgarten, The Trial of Lizzie Borden, in
THE WORLD OF LAW: LAW AS LITERATURE 263, 278-81 (Ephraim London ed., 1960).
My thanks to my colleague Ted St. Antoine for pointing out this illustration to me.
59. For a full and vivid account of this incident, see ARON STEUER, MAX D.
STEUER: TRIAL LAWYER 83-110 (1950).
60. See Crump, supra note 1, at 39-41.
61. See id. at 19-20, 40.
62. The Simpson civil jury heard testimony from October 25, 1996 until Janu-
ary 16, 1997. See Simpson Case Jurors Are Shown Grisly Photo as Testimony Be-
gins, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 1996, at A3; Simpson Trial Testimony Ends; Closing Ar-
guments on Tuesday, CmH. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1997, at A10.
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the experience of the criminal trial.
Let us assume, though, that at the margin some potential ju-
rors do not serve because trials are extended by evidence of little
value. Professor Crump carries the point further, stating that "[t]he
strategic use of irrelevant evidence to exacerbate these effects and
skew the jury venire is a serious threat to our system of justice by
jury trials."63 1 will not lose much sleep on account of this threat, be-
cause the strategy does not generally seem plausible to me. It seems
unlikely to me that, say, the plaintiffs' lawyers in the Texaco-
Pennzoil trial seeded the trial with nearly worthless evidence so
that potential jurors of a pro-defense inclination would be discour-
aged from serving in future cases. And I suspect that, at least in
some extended cases, the defense lawyers, who are presumably paid
by the hour, introduce at least as much evidence of this sort as do
the plaintiffs lawyers, who may well be working on a contingency.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have stated some quibbles with Professor Crump's analysis.
But I think his article is very valuable. It forces us to attempt to
shed light on a shadowy area of the law of evidence. This is an area
of theoretical importance, because it has to do with how one of the
bedrock principles of evidence, relevance, is understood. And it is an
area of practical importance as well, because it has to do with much
of the time that is actually consumed in court. I have proposed a
modest change in the Rules, but one that I think is more aimed at
theoretical neatness than practical improvement. In my view, no
change in the Rules is necessary to achieve such improvement, nor
would it likely be effectual. To the extent that improvement means
more extensive exclusion of evidence of insubstantial probative
value, it will only come if judges use more aggressively the tools
they already have. The proponent's self-restraint is not always a
sufficient check on such evidence because, as Professor Crump dem-
onstrates, the evidence may have consequences that are beneficial
to the proponent but harmful to the search for truth and the effi-
ciency of the judicial system.
63. Crump, supra note 1, at 42.
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